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Part I 
 
In the autumn of 2011 I had the privilege of being a Getty Visiting Professor at 
Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.  The JNU’s graduate programme is 
surprisingly one of the very few in art history in the whole of India. There are less 
than three departments or schools for the study of art history in India despite the 
wealth of cultural heritage to be studied.  The Getty is supporting their endeavours 
to develop the field by enabling the JNU to invite Western art historians who can 
share with the JNU graduates specific research interests and scholarly 
methodologies being developed currently in Europe and the Americas.  I was 
invited as a ‘Western feminist art historian’ to elaborate on gender in the history of 
art as it has been studied in the West.   Their expectations of me were based on those 
of my publications that had initially contributed to the establishment of the very 
possibility of a ‘feminist intervention in art’s histories’—a formulation I prefer to the 
simple addition of feminist as an adjectival qualifier of a singular entity ‘Art 
History’.1 Thus, when I proposed a series of lectures and seminars about trauma and 
aesthetic transformation, my hosts were frankly surprised.  What could explain the 
trajectory from feminism, understood as research into art made by women and a 
critique of structural disciplinary sexism that had ‘disappeared’ women artists from 
the art historical record, to a preoccupation with trauma and historical catastrophe 
or indeed with aesthetics? What explains the pathetic and aesthetic turn? 
 Surely feminist art history was allied to a materialist social history of art, 
focussing on terms such as ideology, representation, discourse, power, and social 
formation.  Aesthetics has been considered either part of a rejected philosophical, 
hence ahistorical and asocial model or it is associated with quality judgements, 
formal appraisals and individual responses to art objects indifferent to the mess of 
politics and social struggle.  What truck could feminists have with aesthetics beyond 
the already long since doomed notion that women artists exhibited a collectively 
female or feminine aesthetic sensibility? 2 
 
1 Griselda Pollock, ‘Feminist Interventions in the Histories of Art: An Introduction’, Vision and 
Difference: Feminism, Femininities and the Histories of Art London: Routledge, 1988 and Classic Edition, 
2003, 1-17.  For clarification of my usage of terms in this article, the term History of Art refers to the 
domain of study; Art History is the discipline that performs and shapes that study. Lower case art 
history refers generically to the subject area in the catalogue of university subjects. 
2 The notion of a specific feminine aesthetic sensibility or forms was mooted by Lucy Lippard, From the 
Centre: Feminist Essays on Women and Art, New York: E.P. Dutton, Inc., 1976. Since the 1980s there has Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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In the Spring of 2001 the Clark Art Institute organized a tri-focussed 
conference Art History, Aesthetics and Visual Studies. Rembrandt’s etching of Three 
Trees (1645) provided an image for the organizers’ sense of three distinct postures in 
a single landscape, although the sublimated reference to the three crosses of the 
Crucifixion introduced unacknowledged problems to this image. I imagined that the 
invited speakers were being distributed to represent these three positions. Speaking 
from a feminist ‘perspective’, I was supposedly aligned by the organizers with 
Visual Studies, hence anti-art history and certainly an- if not anti-aesthetic.  But they 
had not kept up with my actual work and were thus perplexed when I gave a paper 
about the ‘Aesthetics of Difference’ drawing heavily on psychoanalytical theories of 
the coincidence of the aesthetic and theories of sexual difference.3  As the 
introduction to my paper, and inspired by a lecture at the Getty by Paul Barolsky, I 
analyzed a story Vasari tells about Leonard da Vinci. His father has a farmworker 
who buys a shield and wants it carved. Ser Piero knows just the man for the job.  
Leonardo agrees and begins to collect a vast array of insect and creepy crawlies 
from which he hopes to derive a truly horrifying image of the Medusa–what else 
would go on a shield? But he takes too long and Ser Piero buys a readymade for his 
worker. But eventually Leonardo invites his father back to see the original shield. In 
a darkened room, propped so as to hide its supports, the painted shield awaits the 
unsuspecting Ser Piero who, on entering the room gasps in horror and faints into his 
son’s hands, before realizing that he has not looked on death, but only an image.  
The tale exemplifies perfectly what Lacan defines as fascinum: ‘the evil eye is the 
fascinum, it is that which has the power of arresting movement and, literally killing 
life… the anti-life, anti-movement function of this terminal point is the fascinum, and 
it is precisely one of the dimensions in which the power of the gaze is exercised 
directly’.4 Against this deadliness that menaces via the gaze split from the eye and 
hence vision, the painter Bracha Ettinger defines an aesthetic dimension, discovered 
specifically through the temporality and durations of both painting and looking at 
paintings. This she names fascinance, an extension of her theory of a Matrixial gaze, a 
creative, durational, co-affecting and transformational mode of aesthetic sense-
knowing that is not purely scopic, that means, not just vision, but the affect and 
desire-ladened aesthetic field charged up from infancy’s investment of sight with 
                                                                                                                                            
been a rich and diverse literature of feminist interventions in theories of the aesthetic some indicating 
not a feminine but a feminist aesthetic. See Gisela Ecker (ed.) (1986). Feminist Aesthetics. Trans. Harriet 
Anderson. Boston: Beacon Press; Christine Battersby, Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989; Peggy Zeglin Brand and Korsmeyer Carolyn, (eds.), 
Feminism and Tradition in Aesthetics. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995; 
Rita Felski, Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989. Penny Florence and Nicola Foster (eds.), Differential Aesthetics: Art Practices, 
Philosophy, and Feminist Understandings, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 2000; Carolyn Korsmeyer, Gender and 
Aesthetics: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2004; Ryan Musgrave, (ed.), (forthcoming Feminist 
Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art: The Power of Critical Visions and Creative Engagement. Springer, 
Netherlands: Kluwer/Springer, 2009. 
3 Griselda Pollock, ‘The Aesthetics of Difference’, in Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey (eds.)  Art 
History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies, Williamstown, MA.: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute and 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, 147-76. 
4 Jacques Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis [1973], ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans Alan 
Sheridan, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979, 118. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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many levels not of anxiety and dread (Freud/Lacan) but of voluptuous intensities 
and yearnings for connectivity.  Ettinger writes: 
 
Fascinance  is  an  aesthetic  event  that  operates  in  the  prolongation  and 
delaying  of  the  time  of  the  encounter-event  [in  the  making  and  in  the 
viewing]  and  allows  a  working-through  of  Matrixial  differentiating-in-
jointness and co-poiesis.  Fascinance can take place only in a borderlinking 
within  a  real,  traumatic  or  phantasmatic,  compassionate  hospitality. 
Fascinance might turn into fascinum when castration, separation, weaning, or 
splitting abruptly intervenes.5 
 
This is perhaps an unrecognizable concept of art’s potentiality lodged in an 
unfamiliar and distractingly specialist psychoanalytical vocabulary.  I do not 
introduce it to advocate normative adoption of psychoanalytical aesthetics.  Rather 
it indicates that different lines of research focus on different problematics, at once 
opening up old questions to new ways of thinking and identifying new questions 
and problematics that necessitate theoretical innovation of terms to take us towards 
such hitherto unrecognized problematics.  Thus the question of the intimacy 
between psychological human becoming, subjectivity, sexual difference and the 
aesthetic as form of sense-affective-sub-knowledge is a field hardly imagined in 
classical philosophical aesthetics, Freudian or Kleinian psychoanalytical aesthetics, 
and even feminist aesthetics. This field is not a new one in the sense of coming after 
and displacing former dominant or popular approaches.  It is opened up by those 
who choose to investigate it, offered then to the theoretical and historiographical 
landscape of art practice, theory and history, in order to take its place as part of that 
landscape.  Thus the metaphor of space is more hospitable to specialized and 
diverse lines of enquiry than the linear model implied in the notion of ‘After the 
New art History’ and the competition for what’s next.   Bracha Ettinger also writes: 
 
Wit(h)nessing requires your borderlinking and your participating in a 
time-space-encounter-event. In that sense, art as transcryptum is the 
space of a potential future offered always in a certain now. ‘Offered’ 
does not mean that the opportunity is going to be taken, or that there can 
be a pre-scription concerning what would create it. Art offers an 
occurrence. You might not enter at all this time-space, or the artwork 
might not offer it to you. But also: if you enter, and if it offers, 
you will discover in yourself a potentiality for resistance that is only 
born in such a borderspace-bordertime to begin with. If such 
resistance also develops from the proto- ethical into the ethical 
space that enters the public domain, it transgresses all prescribed 
political agendas and at the same time it can produce transformations 
in the existing political sphere.6 
 
5 Bracha Ettinger, ‘Fascinance and the Girl to m/Other Matrixial Feminine Difference’ in Psychoanalysis 
and the Image; Transdisciplinary Perspectives edited by Griselda Pollock, Boston and Oxford: Blackwell’s, 
2006, 61. 
6 Bracha L. Ettinger, ‘Fragilization and Resistance’, In Tero Nauha, Tero and AkseliVirtanen,  
(eds), Bracha L. Ettinger: Fragilization and Resistance, Helsinki: Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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Is the turn to the pathetic and the aesthetic a turn away from the political or 
a path towards it but coming from another direction? Ettinger’s proposition does 
not oppose aesthetics to politics, or subordinate the former to the latter, but asks if 
the aesthetical domain has within it some useful knowledge or even subjective 
dispositions that being proto-ethical, foster inclinations towards respect, care and 
compassion for the other, which can subsequently enter into and transform another 
sphere of public debate and action. When the entry is made from this direction the 
translated aesthetical-proto-ethical-ethical trajectory transgresses existing political 
agendas and even concepts of the agonistically political with potentials that can 
produce transformations in this sphere in the form of reorientations, new 
attunements and above all new ways of imagining and releasing other forms of 
desire or yearning for connectivity and for the life of the other. 
You might then call this an unexpected turn, turning the usual direction of 
politics to art into reverse while proposing a different ground, the aesthetic, for 
understanding what art offers to the world into which it intervenes like a Trojan 
horse from margins of consciousness and even the unconscious from beyond the 
boundaries of our sense of the time of human life: pre-natality and post-life.  Let me 
explain. 
 
The Long Journey 
 
To me the journey that puzzled both the colleagues at the JNU and the Clark has an 
inner logic. At the same time what appears as unexpected turns registers firstly, the 
prolonged engagement necessary to work through a project such as the encounter of 
feminist through and art/art history and secondly, an equally necessary 
responsiveness to shifts in the larger historical and cultural context in which we 
work as scholars. I can look back over the journey from my initiation into art history 
in 1969 to my presentation of the themes of a forthcoming book on trauma and the 
aesthetic and plot out a pattern that involves both continuities and shifts of 
direction, all nonetheless consistent with the unfolding elaboration of what I named 
in 1988 ‘feminist interventions in the histories of art’. Why?   
The project is very long-term and extremely challenging.  I have recently 
defined feminism as a virtuality in philosophical terms.  Whatever it might be, or 
whatever its effects are, are not yet realized. Far from being over, feminism is in 
state of becoming without a known destiny or end.  Elements have been actualized 
in several moments (the vote, access to education, some amelioration of inequality, 
new intellectual projects etc., changes in sexual attitudes and rights) and in 
contingent and variable forms so far. But that does not exhaust feminism as a 
struggle for decency, dignity, safety, and an end to sexual violence and violation. 
Originating long before Modernity, a feminist challenge to the long durée of 
phallocentric symbolic and social organization became, however, a critical 
dimension of and in Modernity because of the historical coincidence between a 
politics of revolutionary challenge to previous modes of theocratic and aristocratic 
                                                                                                                                            
Finnish Academy of Fine Arts with Aivojen yhteistyo, 2009. Reprinted 
in: Studies in the Maternal, no 2, 2009, pp. 17-18. 
<http://www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk/back_issues/issue_two/ettinger.html> Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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authority under the banner of ‘rights’ and the contradictions that emerged in the 
subsequent bourgeois order that proclaimed freedom but made gender itself a major 
axis of exclusion. Side by side with enslaved people and emergent working classes, 
women emerged for the first time in history as a political collectivity redefining 
their relation to the state and society through the concept of inherent rights: at first 
exclusively named the Rights of Man. Man’s claim to false universality was 
immediately challenged by Women – hitherto a relatively insignificant category of 
the political or social, giving birth as it were to a distinctively modern debate that 
still rages about the socio-political and economic significance of gender and the 
cultural valency of sexual difference, the former referring to social formations of 
‘man’ and ‘woman’ and the latter to symbolic and imaginative figurations of 
masculine and feminine psycho-linguistic positions.  Shorthanded as ‘the Woman 
Question’, gender has been played out in varying ways throughout Modernity, 
becoming one of its key signifiers.    
Thus it is historically inaccurate to locate a feminist moment only as a 
politically active flare-up in the 1970s-80s, a moment which can be thankfully 
confined to the past.  Doing so allows some to believe that we can now be post-
feminist and get on with something else.   What I am proposing by insisting on the 
long durée of what Julia Kristeva names the monumental time of the psycho-
symbolic relations of reproduction, hence sex, gender, and sexuality, enables us to 
locate self-conscious and collective feminist questioning in the linear time of 
political and economic shifts such as Modernity and, like modern dreams of full 
democracy itself, to recognize it as still very unfinished business.7  As such, without 
limiting essentializing definition, the feminist project as the historical and political 
face of this deep monumental time of sex and gender is constantly changing, 
adjusting to the transformations of its own socio-political and symbolic ground, to 
new configurations responding to the very changes its various moments of 
actualization have themselves generated.  For instance, the initially necessary 
protest against gross sexism of absolute exclusion of women generated a mode of 
protest and a political egalitarian rectification that was polemical and abrasive, 
energetic and exploratory.  That protest belonged to a moment of many new social 
movements motivated by the resistance to total exclusion or tokenism on grounds of 
race and sexuality as well.  In the wake of even limited success, for the resistance 
remains powerful, the challenges change, the possibilities for different enquiries and 
practices emerge.  Attuned to the deep, structural and mythic potency of gender and 
sexual difference in societies and their cultural imaginaries, and to the shifting 
articulations of its urgencies and its troubling of power and identities, feminist 
interventions morph constantly into new forms.  Rather than a linear history of 
beginnings, fadings and endings, I think we better understand the phenomenon 
through the image of a landscape, with many different features, diverse settlements, 
reworked connections, new highways and recovered byways, and shifting geologies 
 
7 Julia Kristeva, ‘Women’s Time’ [1979], in Toril Moi (ed.),The Kristeva Reader, Oxford: Blackwell’s, 1986, 
187-213.   In other words, we confront two temporal dimensions: the time of linear history, cursive time 
(as Nietszche called it), and the time of another history, thus another time, monumental time (again 
according to Nietszche), which englobes these supra-national, socio-cultural ensembles within even 
larger entities.’ 189. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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as well as refashioned surfaces. Climate changes and weather variations inflect a 
landscape sometimes moved by seismic shifts or unexpected disasters.  
The historic significance of the struggle for women’s rights results not only 
in extended citizenship politically but in the access of women, in numbers, to higher 
education, and thence to their working as scholars ‘in their own name’, on the 
question of gender and knowledge, and on the enquiry through all the disciplines of 
the academy into forgotten histories and inscriptions as well as into new scientific 
studies of every kind.   Never before in history have women qua women thought, 
written, researched and questioned.  This itself changes the landscape into one 
unimagined by early suffrage campaigners and quite different from what activists 
promote as priority.  Thinking ‘as a feminist’ is different from campaigning for a 
specific social change.  It changes ‘the distribution of the sensible’: what can be seen, 
said, thought, written and done.8 
What happened when this historic feminist impulse and academic adventure 
encountered Art History (the discipline and the domain) around 1970 was at once 
symptomatic of world-historic change and locally significant.  Art History performs 
both an academic function as an historical discipline and a public function as the 
conserver and interpreter of symbolically significant and influential cultural 
memory.  Part of nation building and national cultural definition, art as it is 
represented through its curatorial and academic institutions has profound effects. 
Being questioned in New Delhi as to why a Western feminist turns up to 
lecture on trauma and aesthetic transformation rather than gender in art or the 
politics of gender in art history forced me articulate my understanding of what it 
means to participate in a long-term project that necessarily unfolds in ways 
unpredicted by its first moves.  If Old Mistresses (1981), my first book, co-authored 
with Rozsika Parker, participated in a Foucault-type of discourse analysis of art 
historical writing and language, a second book moved onto Vision and Difference 
(1988) a more thematic set of questions about reading art for inscriptions of 
difference. Shifting the problematic from art to vision, visuality and the scopic field 
marked a reformulation of ways of working with the practices Art History renders 
into series of authored objects filiated down stylistic and period-based histories. 
Gender or sexual difference never function nakedly; they are implicated in other 
axes of differentiation and power we name class and race.  Thus engaging with 
questions of internal agonistic tensions between ‘women’ whose initial collectivity 
could not be unproblematically sustained, opened on questions of how a 
postcolonial, international and queer feminist project might write itself: Gender and 
the Colour of Art History (1993) explored the racist sub-text in both art practices and 
art writing; Generations and Geographies (1996) emerged as a concept through which 
to attend to the double axis on which artistic practices attain their specificity: one 
axis is temporal—familial-historical—and the other is spatial—geopolitical.  These 
moves relentlessly sought to move beyond any essentializing of difference in art.  
This then brought me back to questions of how such insights work not only in 
 
8 Jacques Ranci￨re, ‘The Distribution of the Sensible’ [2000], The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel 
Rockhill, London: Verso, 2004, 7-46.   Rockhill summarizes: ‘The distribution of the sensible thus 
produces a mode of self-evident facts of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is 
visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made or done.  Strictly speaking ‘distribution’ 
refers both to forms of inclusion and to forms of exclusion.’, 85 Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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specialist studies of art made by women, but art by men as well, since all subjects 
are formed on both axes and through psycho-symbolic formations of class and race-
inflected sexual difference.  Hence Differencing the Canon (1999) became a working 
concept, freely translating Derridian différance to move beyond fixed notions of 
difference from or between entities, not only enabling the elaboration of feminist 
readings of art from all times and places but forcing into view the subject who 
undertakes such readings, formed not only as a certain kind of political subject, a 
feminist, but also dealing with what psychoanalysis teaches us ‘speaks us’: desire.  
Having to account for my own desires, a desire for difference, while being also 
subject to occlusions, identifications, blind spots and antagonisms took the project 
into both epistemology and psychoanalysis.  Time and space are central to the art 
historical imaginary that narrates a history of art through time but divides it up 
spatially into regions and nations.  Time and space join the archive—the museum as 
a temporalizing and spatializing apparatus for conserving but also meeting with 
art—in the next incarnation of my project as the virtual feminist museum. 9 
This concept returned to the point of my beginning with what was or was 
not in the cultural archive, in its books, but most concretely in its museums. 
Museums preserve and present art past and present, shaping cultural memory 
while limiting or inspiring the creative work of new generations according to what 
is offered—or not—to them.  If the museum forms and performs the canon, 
differencing must also work here. Yet its institutional foundations, corporate and 
national-cultural, now heritage and tourism, have not been made the museum 
hospitable to the challenges of most of the new social movements.  Still 
institutionally failing to address racism, sexism or homophobia even while making 
certain token gestures in acquisitions and temporary exhibitions, the museum has 
been very slow to take on any feminist challenge.  Only in 2009, after almost forty 
years since the initial protests against gross disproportions of men and women 
shown in major museums, did the Centre Pompidou in Paris do the daring thing 
and devote all of its galleries for art since 1970 to be populated exclusively by work 
by artists who are women: Elles@Pompidou. To do so, however, it had to 
acknowledge the institution’s long-term failure to collect the key works by women 
in the last half-century. Considerable numbers of the works in show were donated 
or acquired in the preceding few years before the show opened and during its run. 
No other modern art museum has made such a gesture. The Museum of Modern 
Art in New York received a donation from Sarah Peters creating The Modern 
Women’s Fund in order to raise the issues and produce a major catalogue of work by 
women in the modern era. Special small exhibitions accompanied its publication. 
The Moderna Museet in Stockholm had to launch a major fund raising programme 
in 2007 to rectify their severe gender imbalance.10 Welcome as such minimal but 
 
9 Griselda Pollock, Encounters in the Virtual Feminist Museum: Time, Space and the Archive, London and 
New York: Routledge, 2007. 
10 Camille Morineau, Elles@Pompidou: Women Artists in the Collection of the Musée National d’Art Moderne, 
Centre de Création Industrielle, Paris: Editions du Centre Pompidou, 2009.    
Cornelia Butler and Alexandra Schwartz, Modern Women: Women Artists at the Museum of Modern Art, 
New York: MoMA, 2010.  Lars Nittve of the Moderna Museet, Stockholm launched a campaign, The 
Second Museum of our Wishes, to improve the gender balance in the collection, begun in the 1950s, but 
finding that by 2009 it had failed to curate the work of women artists. Twenty-four works by thirteen Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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significant gestures are, these institutions, forty years on, have only just cottoned 
onto rectification of gross inequality. They have not, perhaps cannot, begin to take 
on board the transformation of ways of seeing art or presenting what it does that are 
fundamental to the feminist critique performed in art as much as in art historical 
writing. 
Thus my virtual feminist museum becomes a necessity for two reasons. The 
first is to elaborate the virtuality of feminism, its endless becoming, its future, 
unexhausted and as yet not fully known potentiality for radical and deep structural 
changes. The second is to offer examples of feminist ways of thinking about and 
presenting something other than art history’s conventional modes of ‘art’ and ‘the 
artist’ while engaging deeply with what Bracha Ettinger calls ‘artworking’.  Clearly 
inspired by Aby Warburg’s legacy and his unfinished and perplexing project in his 
Mnemosyne Bilder Atlas, the Virtual Feminist Museum is not an agenda but a method 
for exploring other sets or series of images and objects and other modes of relating 
them.  Hence the scenario of Sigmund Freud’s practice of psychoanalysis amidst his 
collection of antiquities that function as ‘signs’ and psycho-cultural mnemonics also 
offers another source of inspiration. Both allow for a dynamic around the idea of 
encounter: encounters between objects classified and separated otherwise by 
conventions of art history (period, medium, nation, artist, style etc.) and encounters 
between viewers/readers and the assemblage created by other logics of association, 
the new text woven out of the encounters between images/objects.  The Virtual 
Feminist Museum mimics the many rooms and different modes of the museum 
while offering new logics of connection, posing different questions to the 
assemblages, and seeking other knowledges that might exceed the premises upon 
which the initial conversation-encounters were planned. The museum has its places 
of display, its archives, its video and cinematèque, its library, its spaces for 
theoretical exchange. It is also responsive to changing priorities and the emergence 
of new perspectives, questions and critical re-examination. 
Understanding my own trajectory by means of a series of concepts developed 
to work through a constantly unfolding, unpredictable, dynamic exploration of art 
and culture generated by the initial raising of the repressed question of gender, 
allows me to make two key assertions that contest the proposition that we are now 
‘after the new art history’.  It is far too soon to assume that a long-term project is 
‘over’; rather it might be necessary to track more carefully the processes and 
moments of its inevitably changing evolution.   Secondly, we need to ask what is the 
nature of the ‘desire’ that seeks to place any forms of art history in the past? 
I have no issues with scholars feeling the need to expand the field of our 
very complex endeavour, to reconceptualize the central problematics for research.  
Indeed the idea of art historical research as a landscape with many settlements, each 
with outstanding scholars devoting years to dealing with their chosen problematic, 
seems vital precisely because of the dangers of institutionalizing and canonizing a 
very limited set of propositions and procedures. It was that straitjacket effect that 
initiated a moment that I am calling the adversarial. 
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The Adversarial Moment, not ‘The New art History’ 
 
Some years ago, I wrote a paper called ‘The Mirage of Posterity’.  There were a lot of 
posts around: postmodernity, postcoloniality, and postfeminism.  These were not, 
however, of the same order. Post-modernity was understood as Modernity’s 
unresolved contradictions come home to roos evidencing an internal critique and 
mournful disenchantment. Postcoloniality speaks to both renegotiating the dark 
legacies of colonization and celebrating the creative responses to situations of 
release from colonial domination that implicate former colonizer peoples and 
colonized peoples in new and hybrid relations. Postfeminism was declared, 
however, to suggest that feminism was over, done with, relegated to the past. After-
feminism.  I wanted above all to challenge this mirage of willed posterity.  Feminism 
is not over; it is still relevant, vital, needed.  But it soon became apparent, that once 
someone wants you dead, your resistance is already spectral. Resistance would need 
a different strategy and use of my own theoretical resources to comprehend the 
impulse to negate. 
The cultural and literary theorist Raymond Williams offered the suggestion 
that at any moment in cultural history, there will be residual, dominant and 
emergent elements.11 The new does not completely replace the old, for the old is 
often not yet exhausted. Whatever dominates is never alone on the scene; emergent 
forces are always being generated within it. In Art History, for instance, there was a 
moment in the late twentieth century when emergent forms contested the 
dominance of existing conventions. The key question now is what are the emergent 
trends and whence do they come? What has become or remained dominant? How 
might residual elements function as a kind of conscience for those seeking new 
dominations? 
There is we know is a sociology of the discipline of Art History: who does 
what, where and why? There were largely men’s clubs for the study of different 
periods such as the Italian Renaissance or the Dutch seventeenth century, and clubs 
for the scholars specializing in the oeuvres of specific such as Rembrandt Rubens, 
Turner, Picasso or Richter.  We are also at this moment witnessing a worldwide shift 
to a focus on contemporary art.  Something like 85% of PhD students in US graduate 
schools are writing about contemporary art. I imagine similar statistics in the UK.  
Does this not register a very substantial shift in the historical imagination that once 
fed into Art History and the interests its historicizing serviced?  
As an institutional academic and museum discipline, Art History was 
created in the nineteenth century nation states that defined their identities by 
territorialized, racialized and selective cultural narratives of which the history of 
their art was the visual and material track imbued with a deeply Hegelian, 
progressivist telos.  The shift to the contemporary may register a radical sociological 
alteration of our relation to time—a loss of the historical—but also to space, which is 
no longer exclusively defined by such national entities because of 
internationalization and globalization. The contemporary is at once a kind of 
 
11 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 121-27. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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simultaneity typical of rapidly changing economic-technological remappings of 
time and space. The contemporary refers to what is happening now or around us. It 
is also a usefully shapeless envelope that will include rapidly displaced novelty, 
with swift losses of position as the latest and the leading.  At the same time, this 
shift to the study of the contemporary amongst graduates registers, 
symptomatically, a new reality: the future lies not in the academy and university, 
shrinking and failing to provide secure professional futures for the bright young 
scholars, but in the ever expanding curatorial field with collectors, dealers, 
proliferating biennales and new museums of contemporary art as the field of 
contemporary art making and consumption itself explodes under the pressure of the 
new uneven distributions of wealth created in rapidly expanding economies in Asia 
and through the  now unchallenged force of globalizing capitalism in its current 
phase.  
If this is a crude picture of the present, what was the past? 
The so-called culture wars of the later twentieth century created an 
adversarial condition. The old or canonical Art History inherited from the 
nineteenth century was forcefully challenged by the emergence of a range of critical 
formations. Each one proposed different procedures and identified different issues 
that had to be confronted in both the analysis of art’s histories and in the analysis of 
Art History itself as historical and ideological formation.   
Was this simply pluralization? Or was it symptomatic of a key problem of 
the adversarial moment?  Raymond Williams identified a ‘selective tradition’ that 
functioned hegemonically to exclude from consideration and respect a range of 
factors shaping the production and consumption of cultural forms, while actively 
producing a representation of and for the world deeply marked by sets of selective 
and often violently supported interests which were passed off simply as ‘tradition’.12  
So the issue was not a ‘new art history’ to replace the old.  The adversarial moment 
challenged the very assumptions of Art History itself as the production of a selective 
tradition masquerading as the only tradition.  Pluralizing the concept of art’s 
histories as did Adrian Rifkin in 1986 and I did in 1988 exploded the idea of a 
consensus and hence of a simple replacement of one orthodoxy by another under 
the unchallenged assumption that the linking art and history was self-evident and 
took only the forms Art History had predominantly specified. In a volume titled The 
NEW Art History, published in 1986, Adrian Rifkin already declared the ‘idea of a 
new art history stale… an anxious liberal stratagem to market a faded product in a 
new package’. Rifkin critiqued a deep conservatism in much of the so-called new art 
history that did not, in effect, really question the canon, the tradition and its 
cherished series of objects. Referencing Walter Benjamin’s critique of that privileged 
series: art objects and the artist, Rifkin wrote: 
 
The common element of all these new art histories is the coupling one way 
round of the other of these two words ‘art’ and ‘history’. They remake the 
coupling, and it holds them together too. But whether you take it in the 
shape of the museum, the coffee table book, the auction house catalogue or 
 
12 Williams, Marxism and Literature, 114-15 and Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution, 
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the scholarly monograph, in forms old and new, it signals only one series of 
valued objects, objects whose culturally ascribed value demands that they have their 
own history. This is the ‘series’ that Walter Benjamin described as the 
expropriated trophies of class domination, ripped out of their production 
history, represented as a natural repository of values, and demanding 
acquiescence that they should be recognized as such. It is to this series that 
new art historians put their questions, Marxist or feminist, or whatever. 
Even though they know that the series is an effect of history, they refuse to 
allow this knowledge to undermine their object of study.13 
 
Rifkin thus locates the contest not as a battle between brands of art history, 
new or old, but between modes of analysis that do or do not accept the central 
premises of what has come to be known as Art History: a series of objects that have 
value sustained by their own historicization torn asunder from the messy 
bloodiness of their real conditions of production and use. 
Rifkin was correct in so far as within the emergent contestants there was 
another level of conflict precisely because some wished to defend the series against 
those prepared to deconstruct it. Leading social historians of art for instance 
dismissed certain concurrent tendencies such as feminism or queer studies as either 
mere novelty seeking (Clark) or (unforgivably) as ‘Balkanization’ (Crow).  Who can 
forget the shock of Clark’s statement in 1974? 
 
It ought to be clear now that I’m not interested in the social history of art as 
part of a cheerful diversification of the subject, taking its place alongside 
other varieties—formalist, ‘modernist’, sub-Freudian, filmic, feminist, 
‘radical’ all of them hot-foot in pursuit of the New.  For diversification, read 
disintegration. 14 
 
Both Rifkin and Clark, probably in some people’s minds iconic figures of the 
‘new art history’ disown the term completely but for radically different reasons. 
Clark seeks to hold his practice against a new supermarket of brands of art history 
that splinter and trivialize fundamental questions while Rifkin is asking scholars to 
imagine modes of analysis not defined by being Art History at all (art made by 
artists producing a category of valued objects with their own histories). 
By naming this the adversarial moment I want to stress that it was not, 
despite Clark’s and Crow’s position, simply a battle for the heartland of Art History 
in the grand manner of revolutionary theory.  It was a contest over what field might 
emerge to study certain kinds of aesthetic operations without sustaining Art 
History’s primary system of values.15  Pluralization of art’s histories did not merely 
 
13 Adrian Rifkin, ‘Art’s Histories’, in A.L. Rees and Frances Borzello (eds.) The NEW Art History , 
London: Camden Press, 1986, 158. 
14 T. J. Clark, ‘The Conditions of Artistic Creation’, Times Literary Supplement, 24 May 1974, 562. 
15 For my own analysis of art history as a discourse generating its central artistic subject, the artist, see 
Griselda Pollock, ‘Artists, Mythologies and Media — Genius, Madness and Art History’, Screen 21:3, 
1980, 57-96. See also Mary Kelly’s extension into modernist criticism, ‘Re-Viewing Modernist 
Criticism’, Screen 22:3, 1981, 41-52. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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introduce relativizing variety as Clark dreaded. It stated something deeper about 
the historical enterprise itself. It acknowledged the contested and situated nature of 
all knowledge production while also insisting on an agonistic field of competing 
discourses and interests that did not replace each other. In its forms of intellectual 
practice, research, writing, teaching and collaborating, it forged deep bonds with 
real struggles worldwide against existing forms of domination. Art History was 
hence susceptible as a socially instituted historiographic practice to both 
deconstruction and discourse analysis.   
The adversarial moment was not merely about how to do art history better 
or differently. It opened up for question what the predominant formation called Art 
History did. It examined its real effects. As a representational activity, Art History 
relates to the production and dissemination of systems of power gendered, classed, 
raced and heteronormative.  In 1978, Edward Said’s Foucaldian analysis of 
Orientalism brilliantly exposed the intricate relays and networks between formal 
colonial operations of political and military domination and the esoteric scholarship 
of researchers, the imaginative fiction of novelists, the phantasmatic scenarios of 
painters.16  The point was this.  Power, difference and violence are not extrinsic to 
the discourses of Art History and the practices of art, being imported by ‘politicos’ 
into this formerly politics-free zone. As a discursive and institutional formation Art 
History has both deep roots in, and profound effects on, these systems of 
differentiation and power. Colonization mapped the globe in both material and 
symbolic ways. What Art History does and says has, therefore real political effects 
through its symbolic constructions of a selective cultural tradition and its limited 
assigning of value and creative potential. Socializing art history is not the same as 
reconfiguring our understanding of the relays between art, society and ideological 
effects and transformative aesthetic possibilities. 
So the notion that there were many constituencies and voices emerging to 
contest the production of knowledge about art and the existing systems of 
representation of the world through the presentation of art according to Art 
History’s dominant protocols cannot be, must not be, identified with individuals, 
names, writings, or even specific books: the personalizing habit.  We have to 
understand the historical conditions for this contest arising within the anti- and 
post-colonial struggles, in the new social movements for civil rights that challenged 
racist hierarchies inherited from enslavement history, for lesbian and gay rights and 
for women’s rights, itself with a long durée in the history of Modernity, now 
contesting with Art History because the narratives of human culture and creativity 
shaped by nineteenth century European thought were part and parcel of what was 
being struggled against. 
Our current moment lacks the certainties with which initial adversarial 
contestation reconfigured and relocated critically the art historical and to a lesser 
extent the curatorial field. One of the arguments I wish to make is that it is not a 
matter of coming after, in the sense of an obligatory moving on from what preceded 
us.  Rather we might ask:  Has the project been defeated rather than merely 
superseded? If so, by what and how so?  Is one of the failures of our present the 
incomplete assimilation of the implications or even the substance of that after which 
 
16 Edward Said, Orientalism, London and New York: Routledge, 1978. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
 
  13 
we apparently now stand, wondering what to do and where to go next?  Does not 
the compulsive habit of labelling, classifying, dividing up and then offering to 
students these pre-digested distorted fragments on so-called ‘approaches or 
methods’ courses function as a form of effective destruction, murder even, of that 
which radically challenged the normative discursive and ideological modes for 
thinking about art and its histories? Is the retrospective labelling of interventions as 
assimilable approaches and perspectives precisely a form of effective hegemonic 
defence of the core system of values: the series of valued objects and their authors 
whose exceptionality as ‘artists’ confers value on their products? 
The sense of retrospective evaluation initiated by the Birmingham 
conference puts a parenthesis around the last forty years.  Yet this seems a short 
time frame for the unfolding of specific intellectual-political projects whose deeper 
fidelities might be missed if the differences between various publications were taken 
at face value. So our periodizing habits, as art historians, preclude the appreciation 
of the longer durée of even one intervention or project.   
Another way to think this time-lapse between now and then is to incorporate 
the fact that both intellectual and artistic practices constitute singular sites within 
the larger socio-economic formations of which they are, at the same time, indexical 
symptoms.  These formations are dynamically subject to historical processes that are 
not immediately discernible. Thus any thinking scholar will react in her or his work 
to these shifts in historical time: i.e. cultural shifts within this long durée that has 
recently speeded up its rate of change. Do we then see only unexpected turns, 
changes of direction, betrayals of the project, or are such turns sensitive adjustments 
to changing conditions? Thus what seemed the imperative of social or feminist 
projects in the 1970s was historically specific; the urgencies of the present may shift 
the still feminist project into different modes or questions.  Current feminist 
thinking and analysis addresses questions such as affectivity, ethics, violence, 
citizenship, historical memory, trauma etc… why? Because the cultural 
preoccupations with the catastrophe of the twentieth century have become so 
oppressive that they mandate modes of analysis that classic Marxism with its 
utopian progressivism towards final redemption/revolution or poststructuralism’s 
atheism and disenchantment no longer sustain. We lose their own dynamic 
interactions over time with shifting historical challenges, if we continue to label and 
time-frame intellectual procedures. 
Put simply, in the adversarial moment, Art History was called to account by 
the dispossessed, the colonized, the oppressed and the excluded. These groups’ 
access to education under post-war social democracies and social polices aiming at 
greater social equality made them acutely aware of the contradictions in their own 
societies while providing them with the intellectual tools necessary for mounting 
this challenge from inside the university but outside the disciplines. The studies 
movement challenged the nineteenth century distribution of knowledge by 
traversing disciplinary boundaries in the name of lateral alliances, transdisciplinary 
concepts and new supranational constituencies of opposition: women, lesbian and 
gay, African-American, Hispanic etc. Visual Studies and Cultural Studies were part 
of this creation of the novelties that emerged out of the expansion of the post-1960s 
university whose potential is being erased in Britain by current reconsolidations of 
the universities under new funding schemes that render intellectual adventure a Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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bad financial risk. Our moment of art historical practice is in hock to the nakedly 
dominant form of contemporary capitalism: the market, heritage tourism, culture as 
consumption and entertainment and the nature of economic, social, and cultural life 
in what Zygmunt Bauman has characterized as liquid modernity. This concept might 
also explain this compulsive after-ness. 
One of the most respected of contemporary sociologists, Zygmunt Bauman 
has emerged as a major theorist of the contemporary human condition with his 
concept of liquid modernity.17  Developed across a plethora of books which chart 
liquid life, liquid love, liquid fear, the concept of our times as fluid or liquid as 
opposed to a succession of solidified social formations, temporarily fluid only at 
moments of transition or revolution, offers a new perspective on the cultural 
dominant since the mid-1990s.  Despite Bauman’s having written about art and 
more recently about the changing function of culture in the transition from solid 
modernities to liquid modernity, the world of art history and cultural analysis has 
not embraced the Baumanian diagnosis.  Its crude outlines are this: 
 
In its original formulation, ‘culture′ was intended to be an agent for change, 
a mission undertaken with the aim of educating ‘the people′ by bringing the 
best of human thought and creativity to them. But in our contemporary 
liquid-modern world, culture has lost its missionary role and has become a 
means of seduction: it seeks no longer to enlighten the people but to seduce 
them. The function of culture today is not to satisfy existing needs but to 
create new ones, while simultaneously ensuring that existing needs remain 
permanently unfulfilled. Culture today likens itself to a giant department 
store where the shelves are overflowing with desirable goods that are 
changed on a daily basis—just long enough to stimulate desires whose 
gratification is perpetually postponed.18 
 
There appears now to be no guiding thesis or counter-thesis to enable us to 
discern the critical response to the seductions of the image massively displayed 
across the vast network of international exhibitions and art entertainment venues 
that used to be called museums.  The embrace of the present, and of presentness as a 
novel mode of at once being in time and yet outside of former ideas of temporal 
succession determines that which theorists try to pin down as contemporaneity.  
Thus, in his analysis of what is contemporary art, Terry Smith declares: 
 
Contemporaneity is the fundamental condition of our times, manifest in the 
most distinctive qualities of contemporary life, from the interaction with 
humans and geosphere, through the multeity of cultures and the ideoscope 
of global politics to the interiority of individual being. Against its grain, we 
must write its history, as it is happening, otherwise it will elude us–even 
perhaps destroy us. 19 
 
 
17 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. 
18 Zygmunt Bauman, Culture in a Liquid Modern World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. Back cover. 
19 Terry Smith, What is Contemporary Art, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009, 255. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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Smith’s idea of a desperate necessity to write a history ‘as it happens’ flies in 
the face of conventional ideas of history as that which is not the present, as that from 
whose chaotic occurrences significant order can be gleaned only in retrospect, 
ridding our vision of the chaff of the incidental and distilling the grain of the truly 
determining.  Such a perspective, granting the present the right to define the past, is 
being displaced by a necessity to adjust to a constantly changing, liquefying present, 
moving for its own sake too fast for us to grasp. This is both a very different 
subjective situation and historiographical position. 
As scholars we are not outside of the conditions of our times be they 
liquefying or contemporaneous.  We are its symptoms but also as art historians and 
historiographers we come to the present problematic not only burdened by 
disciplinary protocols derived from the earlier historicist moment of art history as a 
will to create order and derive knowledge from ordering the past by nation, period, 
style, movement, oeuvre and master but with resources for critical self-assessment 
of our own dehistoricizing temporal moment.   
Our discipline was formulated between the philosophic initiative to identify 
a specific mode of experience and its natural or cultural objects—the aesthetic—and 
a historicizing and temporalizing project that enabled a classification of world 
civilizations whose destiny was to arrive at the point from which this history was 
being written under its determinist telos. Are we witnessing the crisis of that art 
historical order from which like rats, the majority of graduate students are fleeing as 
if from the sinking ship?  What do we do with Art History when art writing and 
curatorship become the most fashionable and financially wise investment in liquid 
times? Why tie yourself to a period or a specialism? Why not be flexible following 
the tide of ever changing fashion?  Being in contemporary art allows for the 
millennial generation’s favoured and liquid adjustability, flexibility, and mobility.20 
On the other hand, scholarly art historians are at risk of becoming like birds in the 
wake of the ship of contemporary art, following on and catching up into academic 
currency that which the dealers, collectors and curators lay out in their trail as they 
travel the oceans in their floating cruise ships or insulated private jets.  Many an art 
historian decides his or her topic by seeing upon what the market and the collector 
has conferred status, which their scholarly writing then endorses as immediate 
legitimation (not historicization for that might require critical evaluation rather than 
the supplementation by affirmative or explanatory discourse). This situation is 
seductive. I too have been seduced into the study of the contemporary. Intellectual 
agility is tested as ways of writing up art generates a new idiom of analysis. But, can 
we still keep a historical imagination in play? 
   
 
20 There is a sociological theory about the mentalities of generations. After Generation X, the 
Babyboomers, comes Generation Y or the millennials who form demographic cohort born into the full 
effects of the digital revolution, normative use of technology and new communications and liquid 
modernity.  See William Strauss and Neil Howe, Generations: The History of America’s Future 1584-2069, 
New York; William Morrow, 1998 and Millenials Rising: The Next Generation, New York: Vintage Books, 
2000. There are important implications for all historical disciplines and teachers in these studies of 
radically differentiated perspectives and orientations.  Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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Part II 
 
In this part of the article, I have chosen to perform a work of deconstruction of the 
framework for the conference After the New Art History. Not undertaken as a gesture 
of negative critique, my reading seeks to undo a misrepresentation of the past that 
distorts the future that is being imagined or coaxed into existence. 
  The concluding paragraphs of the call for papers read:  
 
Finally, growing external political pressures on the Academy, which have 
been focused on instrumentalising art history, are potentially threatening to turn the 
discipline into a service industry for the market, stripping it of its force as a mode of 
radical social and cultural inquiry. 
This conference will examine the state and futures of radical art history 
within this context. What has been gained for the discipline over the past 40 years, 
and what are the dangers for these gains in the present? What are the current 
challenges for radical art history, and how are they being met? 
 
There is much I would want to endorse here in terms of thinking about 
where we were and where we are going, and what are the threats to the academic 
and intellectual integrity of our research and teaching. I am less convinced as the 
preceding pages will suggest about a singular notion of a radical art history that 
encompasses all forms of dissidence from that which was hegemonic in the 
discipline under one umbrella. By posing the concept of the adversarial moment, I 
have wanted to reintroduce the historical configuration of the conditions that 
generated a series of mutually challenging critical interventions that have 
themselves unfolded in sustained forms over forty years while the hegemonic 
practices have been consolidated in institutionalized practice sustained by real 
economic and market-led investment in highly valued series of objects and their 
guarantee of value: the privileged author-artist. A radical art history distracts us 
from seeing both the forces that constantly undermine critical practices of thought 
and in art itself while disfiguring the specific values of the many, different event 
antagonistic directions which critical thinking about art, culture, visuality and 
difference have taken. In some cases, these new directions disown their relation to 
Art History completely, founding a distinctive field with its own objects of study 
and methodology. Others forge new interdisciplinary alliances the better to focus on 
a specific problematic folded into the larger field of histories of art, seeing, images, 
representation, perception and imagination. 
 I want, therefore, to tease out from two other paragraphs of the Call for 
Papers the problems we all face as a result of some of Art History’s worst habits and 
how they short-change our ability to use the recent past, a very different moment 
indeed, to make a critical space in this contemporary, liquid time.   
 
The New Art History 
 
The term ‘new art history’ has long been an established – albeit contentious – part of 
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social and feminist art histories of T J Clark and Griselda Pollock of the 1970s 
(expanding in subsequent decades to encompass post-colonial, Freudian, post-
Freudian and wider gender-studies approaches), it denoted a conceptual shift that 
foregrounded the dependence of intellectual inquiry on a priori ideological / political 
values. 
   
The first recorded use of the phrase ‘The New Art History’ appears to have been the 
titling of a conference organized by the editors of BLOCK magazine in 1982: The 
New Art History?. The question mark after the title put it up immediately for 
interrogation. The conference of 2012 and this issue themed ‘After the New Art 
History’ marks the thirtieth anniversary of BLOCK’s conference. The 2012 
conference then becomes the closing parenthesis. Afterwardness is our moment—
does that hint at mere historical supersession? Or might it signal the belated arrival 
of a former trauma, a symptom of Nachträglichkeit? 21  Recall Theodor Adorno’s use 
of the notion of ‘after’ in his difficult phrasing of our epoch and our constant 
political orientation: After Auschwitz. This phrase contains both the spatial and 
temporal coordinates of the German word nach. Nach means coming after an event in 
time, but also being oriented towards it, as in journeying towards a certain 
destination whose memory cannot be closed off in the past. ‘After the New Art 
History’ can, therefore, be glossed as the return of the repressed rendering its 
adversarial moment pathogenic, troubling, to be suppressed because it disturbs the 
now. Or it can be a positional question: if it has happened, we cannot but be its 
legatees. The question is who wishes to be faithful to its memory? 
  This year, 2012, is coincidentally also the fortieth anniversary of the John 
Berger’s landmark television series Ways of Seeing.22 Perhaps the BLOCK conference 
in 1982 was itself a tenth anniversary of that event, declaring its own alignment with 
this momentous challenge to establishment, class-privileged and British Art 
History—formed as we know not in the universities of the enlightenment as in 
Europe, but out of a motley crew of relative amateurs, in both senses of the word, 
collectors, connoisseurs, moral evangelists in art, painters, and aristocrats.23 The 
Burlington Magazine, Apollo and the National Gallery formed the foundations for Art 
History in Britain in this century and the oddity of London housing the fragile 
façade of the Courtauld Institute of Art in the 1970s/80s and the exiled and 
 
21 Originally translated as ‘deferred action in English and ‘apr￨s coup’, Jean Laplanche has proposed 
the term ‘afterwardness’ for Freud’s central concept for the psychic processes that do follow linear 
development. Instead events, impressions, feelings and experiences are changed, acquire significance, 
and become psychically effective through the retrospective revision engendered by later events.. Lived 
time generates constant re-arrangement and re-transcription of older elements.  Laplanche defines this 
more precisely by arguing that it is that which in the past was not capable of being assimilated that is 
most particularly susceptible to afterwardly revision. Trauma—that which cannot be processed by the 
psyche but which lends its unbound affects to secondary events that effectively trigger the 
unprocessed event’s occurrence in this secondary, belated but originary repetition. It is the second 
scene that in reversal endows the primary one with its pathogenic affect.  Things become a trauma by 
deferred action. See Jean Laplanche and J-B. Pontalis, ‘Deferred Action’, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 
trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, London:Karnac Books, 1988, 111-13. 
22 John Berger and Mike Dibbs, Ways of Seeing, 4 x 30 minute programmes, (BBC, 1972);  John Berger, 
Ways of Seeing., London: BBC and Penguin Books, 1972.  
23 Griselda Pollock, ‘Art History and Visual Studies in Great Britain and Ireland’ in Matthew Rampley 
et al. (eds.) Handbook of Art History in Europe, Amsterdam: Brill, 2013. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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dislocated Warburg Institutes led to an idiosyncratic revolution in the field of Art 
History forged as much in the art school-polytechnics as in Screen magazine and 
extra-institutional reading groups or magazines like BLOCK and Spare Rib. 
 This other genealogy is not included in the framework identified by the call 
for papers; it is clearly an important addition.  Artist, writer, leftist, Berger framed 
his TV assault on civilizational art history represented by the patrician director of 
the National Gallery, Kenneth Clark by means of a summary of the recently 
translated essay by Walter Benjamin ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproducibility’, which appeared in English in American and British editions in 
1968 and 1970 respectively.24  Thus reclaiming a link to an earlier moment of intense 
politicization of culture and cultural resistance to fascism in the dangerous 1930s, 
Berger assaulted the entire aestheticizing framework of Art History and offered 
much more than a historical materialist reading of art.  Using Benjamin’s shift from 
Art History’s own models, Berger characterizes the vast and largely banal cultural 
production of oil painting as the art of a possessing class. He offers a proto-feminist 
reading of representation of women notably the female nude that iterates this 
condition of ownership, and a revelation of the symmetries and continuities 
between art and advertising, as well as art and pornography.  Berger exploded 
carefully policed boundaries between zones of image culture and blew up the 
selective ‘series’ (recall Rifkin quoting Benjamin) and its system of values. 25 
I also discern, however, perhaps unknown to Berger, equal affinities 
between his book project and the work of another scholar who was opposed to 
aestheticizing art history, Aby Warburg, notably in the Mnemosyne Atlas of 
Warburg’s last years. The relationship lies in the shared focus on the image rather 
than on the art object, personified and idealized as art or artist.  They also share a 
sense of the historical nexus of the often dangerous functioning of the image in its 
varied distribution and uses, while acknowledging the play of deeper psychic and 
social structures elaborating the forms of images grounded in both material and 
psychological necessities.  Finally Warburg, much admired by Walter Benjamin, 
traced the traffic between regimes or sites of image-making and image 
dissemination that did not privilege, therefore, the fine arts over other forms of 
mechanically produced image, high versus popular culture, West versus 
elsewhere.26 Struggling with the long durée and recent racialization of cultural 
difference notably through anti-Semitism, Warburg was definitively anti-nationalist 
and internationalist in his perspective, defying the appropriation of art’s histories 
for modern, nationalist racism and bourgeois Europe’s self-definition and 
 
24 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in Hanna Arendt (ed.) 
Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,Inc,.1968 and London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1970).  The original title in German is ‘Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen 
Reproduzierbarkeit’ (Reproducibility). 
25 For a series of current evaluations of Ways of Seeing see the Ways of Seeing 40th Anniversary Issue, 
Journal of Visual Culture 11:2 (August 2012). See also Art and Exploitation: John Berger’s ‘Ways of Seeing’ at 
40, 12 May 2012, The National Gallery, London, convened by Jonathan Conlin.  
26 For a fine exposition of one example of Warburg’s method and its effects see Charlotte Schoell-Glass, 
‘”Serious Issues”: The Last Plates of Warburg’s Picture Atlas Mnemosyne’, in Richard Woodfield (ed.), 
Art History as Cultural History:Warburg’s Projects, London: Routledge, 2001,183-208. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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delusion.27  Warburg’s absence from our sense of new moves in the art historical 
field is another of our selective memories losses.   
The term ‘new art history’, questioned in the Block conference with an 
interrogative at the end of the phrase had been affirmatively installed in 1986 by a 
publishing venture by two figures on the margins of academic art history, A.L. Rees, 
a film scholar and the journalist and art writer Frances Borzello.28  The authors of the 
volume of this title included were a motley and completely heterogeneous bunch: 
Dawn Ades, Stephen Bann, Jon Bird, Victor Burgin, Lynda Nead, Tom Gretton, 
Charles Harrison, Margaret Iverson, Alex Potts, Neil McWilliam, Paul Overy, 
Marcia Pointon, Adrian Rifkin, John Tagg, Ian Jeffrey. Nothing unites this crew 
from which notably Clark and Pollock are absent. The term New Art History, 
resented by most, has somehow remained in currency despite its having been 
battered to death by a major article within the collection by Adrian Rifkin that I 
have already quoted. Why, we must ask, do we repeat the offence by even using the 
term, while never truly taking to heart what was not only a warning but also a 
devastating critique?   
In 2000, for instance, Jonathan Harris was commissioned by Routledge in to 
write a ‘critical introduction’ to the ‘New Art History’. Repeating the already 
perverting phrase gave renewed life to its fateful formulation and obscured other 
ways of understanding the foundations of the adversarial field.29  He was 
uncomfortable with the title but the publishers needed the tag line to encompass 
and master competing diversity and internal conflicts as a ‘range’ of possible 
‘approaches’ all reduced to a few quotations from each player – just indeed as 
Adrian Rifkin had stated in his excoriating critique of the term in the book of the 
title.  This again erased serious points of conflict, muting the real agonism of what is 
at stake. 
Rifkin had specifically distinguished feminism’s genuine innovations from 
the conventional social histories of art, because, unlike the latter, feminism radically 
challenged the ‘series’ (Benjamin) and the structure of values sustaining it. Thus 
social historians of art from T J Clark to Charles Harrison, can and have ignored the 
issues of race, gender and sexuality, deeming them extrinsic to the proper questions 
of what they defend which remains a white, Eurocentric masculinist canon closed 
against any other modes of reading the image, cultural practices, and committed to 
the centrality of the artistic subject.30   Despite these strongly worded arguments 
 
27 Charlotte Schoell-Glass, Aby Warburg and Anti-semitism: Political Perspectives on Images and Culture, 
trans. Samuel Pakucs Willcocks, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2008. Griselda Pollock, ‘Aby 
Warburg and ‘Thinking Jewish’ in Modernity’ in Jacques Picard, Jacques Revel, Michaeal Steinberg and 
Idith Zertal (eds.) Thinking Jewish Modernity: Thinkers, Writers, Artists, Shapers of Jewish Modernity, Basel: 
University of Basel Press, forthcoming, 2013. 
28 A.L Rees and Frances Borzello, The NEW Art History London: Camden Press, 1986. 
29 Jonathan Harris, The New Art History: A Critical Introduction, London: Routledge, 2001. 
30 One of the more extraordinary events was Charles Harrison, Painting the Difference: Sex and the 
Spectator in Modern Art, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006, a study of sexual difference and 
modernist painting in the nineteenth century that critiqued feminist initiatives in this area as vigilantist 
and proposed that the great canonical male modernists already made sexual difference structural to 
modernist spaces and gazes, Rather than joining in the conversation, feminism was negated in order to 
reassert canonical authority for artists who are men while their women peers are relegated to second 
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against framing the intense debates post 1970s as ‘new’ directions in art history, 
therefore, newness has stuck. In due course, what was new has now become old, 
and so new newnesses must be found because we need to be constantly renewing 
ourselves. 
It is because of this almost millenialist framing of certain approaches as once-
new fashions, that in the field of the new feminism can be treated now as démodé.  
Others, being a little newer and inherently sexier and apparently more easily co-
opted have not been so swiftly shelved. The post-colonial enters, incompletely of 
course, World Art History or Global Art Studies, forgetting the blood and violence 
of international relations in post-and neo-imperial times. Without our noticing, we 
have become symptoms of our own condition: namely of liquid modernity in which 
change is made for the sake of change and the long durée and its deeper historical 
perspectives have become not only uninteresting but unthinkable in terms of a 
matrix that requires newness as the price of any value in a ever shifting condition of 
structural uncertainty necessitated by the current conditions of globalizing 
capitalism. 
T.J. Clark’s manifesto for the social history of art, which he understood as a 
reclamation of an existing but ruptured tradition of historical materialist thinking in 
Art History that had emerged in the 1920s-30s, appeared in the 1973, the year after 
Berger’s publication of Ways of Seeing as a Penguin book, in The Image of the People.31 I 
am not at all convinced that Clark’s careful identification of all the bad habits in 
preceding attempts to articulate art, history and politics that he did not want to 
repeat, has yet been fully grasped.  I wonder how much of his equally finely tuned 
statement of what he aimed to examine, are, or have been really taken to heart, 
understood and communicated when we casually identify him or he gets taught as a 
‘Marxist’ or a ‘social historian of art’?  Very little, I suggest.  
Linking Clark and Pollock, as Marxist and Feminist, align the two as if 
equally possible brands within the basket of novelty, rather than, as they have been 
for many long years, interestingly adversarial if mutually respectful positions with 
the possibility of finding feminists who engage deeply if critically with the historical 
material tradition. Labelling as Marxist, Feminist, Structuralist, Psychoanalytical, 
Post-colonial, Queer makes it easy to stand outside of any of these demanding 
analyses and very different priorities, while completely obfuscating the often finely 
woven intersections. These result not from fixed allegiances to one -ism or position. 
Rather art historians engaging with class, racialization, gender, sexuality and the 
post-colonial are responding to the real of historical agonies subjectively 
experienced and culturally articulated. Thinking is not badged but critically 
responsive to the demands of history. 
Clark contested while acknowledging descent/ dissent from the social 
history of art that he inherited from earlier generations of Marxists who had, he 
argued, been part of the larger historiographical context of later nineteenth and 
early twentieth century history studies within which Art History once held a 
significant position. Clark challenged, however, earlier Marxist theses about culture 
by replacing the crude base/superstructure explanations of one-way determination 
 
31 T.J. Clark. ‘On the Social History of Art, The Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 
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from economic foundations. Informed by Althusserian revisions that allowed each 
level of the social formation some degree of autonomy and cross-determination, 
Clark was interested in interrogating precisely how a social condition becomes an 
aesthetic formulation. Far from replacing formalism or concern with aesthetic 
specificity by pre-given explanations of their causes in a social elsewhere, he wanted 
to trace the specific mediations between social process and artistic form. To do this he 
drew on some of the theoretical currents he had encountered in Paris ca. 1968: 
Deconstruction, Lacan’s new theories of the linguistic psyche, and notably the 
Situationist theory of capital as spectacle that allowed him to read Modernism for its 
failures located in contradictions it rarely overcame.  Although not a Freudian or a 
sub-Freudian, Clark acknowledges furthermore the significance of psychoanalysis 
as a key modernist theory of the mind, subjectivity and necessarily important for 
both aesthetic creation and our readings of it.32   
Amongst his many critiques of the canonical methods within the social 
history of art and beyond that Clark wished to criticize in the discipline in general is 
‘their picture of history as a definite absence from the act of artistic creation: a 
support, a determination, a background, something never actually there when the 
painter stands in front of the canvas, the sculptor asks his model to stand still.’33 
Drawing on a then prevailing structural and Althusserian Marxism, Clark insists 
that: ‘Art is autonomous in relation to other historical events and processes, though 
the grounds of that autonomy alter.’34  Critiqued in a review by Rifkin for remaining 
inside the ‘series’ of great works by great artists, Clark offers a procedure within it 
to modify the way the artist/history transaction might be analysed precisely as a 
transaction and a translation.35 He insists, therefore, that the artist makes the 
encounter with history. It has a certain unpredictable contingency that makes new 
demands of the art historian: the art historian in turn has to discern the historical 
structures that the artist encounters willy-nilly (being a historian) but also to 
disclose the specific conditions of any one meeting when the content of experience 
acquires a form, an event becomes a specific image in a specific medium (being a 
historian of artistic practices). This mediated, transactional work of what I would 
call aesthetic translation is thus at heart a work of transformation in which the work 
of art works its already freighted ideological materials—from actual materials and 
processes to the less tangible but none the less effective ideas, beliefs, and modes of 
experience, themselves preformulated by ideologies that again the artwork works. 
We have here a differentiating assertion of the aesthetic as central to the social art 
historical project, made possible by introducing the Freudian concept of an economy 
of work as in dream work or mourning work: Freud’s dynamic economic modelling 
of psychological processes.  
This is why I have to challenge the phrase: …dependence of intellectual inquiry 
on a priori ideological / political values. 
T. J. Clark’s social history of art is labelled as Marxist (but in a manner 
critical of its own inheritance. Griselda Pollock’s feminist social history of art is 
 
32 T. J. Clark, ‘Freud's Cézanne’, Representations 52 (Fall 1995), 94-122 
33 Clark: The Image of the People, 12. 
34 Clark: The Image of the People, 13. 
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named… well feminist.  These two isms, clearly have had political forms: both 
revolutionary and reformist.  But no one takes to the streets or organizes as political 
parties or movements under such names.  Feminism represents something more 
than the Women’s Movement. ‘Marxist’ and ‘feminist’ identify foundational and 
modern philosophical projects that extend into other areas of social and cultural 
enquiry that may have political effects according to their site of enactment or 
articulation.  These sites of feminist work, for instance, may effect changes in the 
distribution of power, or, in Rancierian terms, the ‘distribution of the sensible’ (what 
can be said, heard, represented) through acknowledging the symbolic and 
imaginative plane as one of the levels of the social ensemble that includes the 
aistheton —what can be apprehended by the senses. 36   
We make the mistake of reading back from symptomatic flare-ups of 
political instances to their underlying theoretical forms, treating the former as the 
cause of the latter. Instead we should understand that there could be no communist 
party without Marx’s thought while Marx’s thought is not identical with communist 
parties or even socialist states. There would be no women’s movement without 
feminist theorization and politicization of rights, society, and gender. Something 
had to be thinkable, sayable and doable before it could be manifested as political 
action. Feminism is, however, ‘managed’ nowadays, that is to say effectively 
negated as a relevant project for our discipline in general, by being framed only as a 
purely political and activist project extraneous to major historiographical or art 
historical inquiry, thus missing the fact that one of the most lasting legacies of its 
most recent resurgence of feminism has been a world-wide intellectual revolution that 
has radically altered the entire field of knowledge.  
We name the matrix for Marxist analysis interrelations between material 
conditions of the production of life and symbolic as well as social forms.  Class is 
one configuration of that relation as a symptom of inequalities generated in those 
historical conditions that might be transcended by action informed by an 
understanding of the matrix.  The matrix of feminist analysis is that axis of social 
distributions of power and a symbolic representation of all power relations we 
name gender.37 Gender as either a social or a symbolic axis was not encompassed in 
Marx’s vision. He naturalized gender hierarchies as pre-social, even though Engels 
identified the latter as potentially the first form of class relation.  Using his insight 
gender theory takes us to the socialization of life, hence touching upon death and 
certainly sex. Gender is at once a social form of hierarchical power and 
disempowerment fracturing human societies along lines of perceived sexual 
division, and a symbolic site for the representation of power in general. To 
feminize/castrate/disempower/subject another being, in terms of class or race is to 
 
36 Ranci￨re, ‘The Distribution of the Sensible’ [2000], The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill, 
London: Verso, 2004, 7-46.    
37 The most comprehensive explanation of this is by Joan W. Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of 
Historical Analysis’, The American Historical Review, 91:5 (1986), 1053-75. Scott reminds us that not only 
is gender not the naming of two sexes but the definition of an asymmetrical relation; ‘Gender is a 
constitutive element of social relations based on perceived differences between the sexes and gender is 
a primary way of signifying relationships of power.’ Reaching from social formation to symbolic 
representation gender also operates at the level subjective identification in ways that traverse the 
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diminish them only because association with the feminine is an association with a 
diminished term vis-à-vis an empowered one. Once gender is introduced as a 
problematic of the fabric of social relations, and of symbolic inscriptions subject to 
historical transformation, then new areas of experience and institutional, discursive 
operations become available for theoretical analysis: sexuality, vision, the body, 
temporality, assigned symbolization of reproduction, social space, violence, 
personal safety, human existence and its modes of continuation and so forth. These 
cut across and even conflict with the priorities emerging out of other matrices such 
as the historical materialist, although valiant efforts have been made to articulate 
not only class with gender, but the social relations of racialized and colonial 
oppressions and those based on human sexualities and psycho-sexual formations of 
desire and embodiment. But they also interrupt or at least qualify those approaches 
that place themselves not outside of history but out of the social. 
The tendency to intellectual laziness through shorthand use of labels is one 
of the major devices for deforming and obliterating the histories of intellectual 
endeavour and their conflicts. The second is personification.  So I am introduced as 
a feminist art historian. This personal labelling allows ‘you’ to think you know what 
the adjective means; it allows the world to keep me confined inside the cage of an 
already-closed mental category. The adjective ‘feminist’ appears to specify and 
identify while it disqualifies me because it leaves unexamined the unmarked 
category ‘art historian’ which is clearly other than the ‘feminist art historian’. She is 
not really an art historian, because she is a feminist art historian. Or she is a 
representative of a minority, a sub-genre of the field, whose outsiderness to the 
unmarked core, namely the un-self-critically normative, is exposed by the need to 
use the adjective to distinguish the other. Most non-feminists sloppily think that 
being a feminist in art history means that I go on and on about women artists, who 
have been excluded from the series of valued objects and their makers, and for 
whom I have to fabricate a special case based on something other than the norms by 
which the included have been included. Being interested in women (as opposed to 
analyzing gender formations) affirms that I must care little about real or good art 
because I place an extraneous concern—gender or sexual difference—above the 
central issues: aesthetic value or historical importance.  My only ground for what I 
do ‘as a feminist’ then appears to arise from extraneous politics imported from 
sociological elsewheres. The Benjaminian critique applies here. The attempt to 
change the field is undermined by such naming so that the canonical series and its 
values, the privileged construction of art and artist, can remain. I am quarantined as 
a feminist while those who are or identify with the privileged place of white straight 
men art historians do not have their sexualities, ethnicities or allegiances to the 
patriarchal distributions of power and privilege inflicted on them as a badge, 
partializing their views. There is thus a fundamental asymmetry that preserves the 
series and its value system. 
Placing me within a feminist sub-set, allows the arguments made by feminist 
thought to be confined to those who choose to be part of the sub-set alone. The 
others, as a result, do not have to read feminist literature, or track the evolving 
project over forty years, analyze the stakes in various arguments and differences, or 
make it part of the discourse, even while those of us who work with feminist Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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concerns do continuously read and engage with a great variety of literatures and 
approaches, open to all searching questioning and new research.   
When I am invited to give a special lecture I often ask the audience what 
work of mine they have read: who in terms of textual enunciation, therefore, do they 
think is speaking to them?  They usually mention a scattering of texts, mostly old 
ones, but never consistent selections. From the typical first year methodology 
courses students may have heard of feminism but it will have been presented as a 
single entity, a single perspective, lumping together several historical generations of 
highly differentiated and argumentative intellectuals who belong to one of the 
major intellectual events of the twentieth century: the entry of women as women 
into the field of research notably in the arts and humanities in order not only to 
speak in their own name  (as opposed to being intellectual transvestites) but to 
reconfigure the landscape, methodologies and effects of intellectual enquiry itself. 
Compression becomes misrepresentation.  We have not yet worked out how to 
incorporate feminist, queer, postcolonial critiques as non-optional necessities for 
any critical thinking about art and culture. 
Self-labelling is one thing.  Identifying with an adversarial intellectual 
project is also a matter of pride. Others’ labelling me or any one else a feminist, 
however, in this manner, is deixical—it points me out—while, at the same time, 
muting the challenge of feminist thought in its complexity and effacing both its 
many histories and its own adversarial or agonistic evolution. The label contains 
both thought and history within the feminist rather than as arising from history 
calling for all of us to recast our modes of operation because, as a result of the event 
that is feminism, we know that gender frames us all.38  If we allow gender, class, 
race and sexuality to be mere tokens in language confined inside an -ism and a 
labelled individual who represents that ‘position’, and upon which certain people 
for reasons of a priori political values insist, it allows the impression that there is an 
art historical field which can be legitimately pursued without such attention to 
structures which are performatively enacted in the rhetoric, the syntax, the 
metaphorics of the language in which we write. 
Gender is not a women’s issue.  It is a fact of culture and society. Writing of 
Freud and Nietzsche, Plato and Freud and phallocentric language in general, the 
philosophers Sarah Kofman, Luce Irigaray and Monique Wittig have demonstrated 
brilliantly that gender and sexuality are not contents of which one may or may not 
speak. They are forms or rather they form the very language and intellectual 
architecture in which white men philosophers philosophize and white men art 
historians do art history. That was the entire point of my book with Rozsika Parker, 
Old Mistresses, a term coincidentally also forged in 1973 to reveal that language itself 
had already foreclosed on any recognition of women as artists of historical 
significance. 
 
38 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1990, offers the provocative idea that gender is an effect of our iteration, our performative 
enunciation of the socially constituted categories.  This is not voluntary performance; but obligatory 
performativity. We become what we say we are. Thus gender has no given origin, source or essence. 
The social ordering of gender notably in a heterosexual matrix of man and woman imprisons us.  
Butler proposes various forms of resistance and transformation once the depth of this entrapment that 
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Old Mistresses, the book, which has just passed its thirtieth anniversary, was 
not a book just or at all about women artists.39 It was a systematic deconstruction of 
the symbolically structuring and performative effects of the language of art 
historical writing that made sexual difference, and its hierarchies and exclusions, 
structural to an ideological project performed across all the instances of art historical 
activity in that form that defines itself by historically significant art objects and their 
creators.  Thus effacement of works by women from view by not collecting and 
showing or by never writing about their works was coupled with, and resulted 
from, an insistent use of gendered metaphorics already at work in Art History. To 
sustain the historically perverting trick of making all art masculine, the discipline 
constantly needed, however, to summon a spectral femininity, equated with lack of 
skill, originality and intellect, to serve as a negative cipher for an ideological 
operation by which art and artistness could be appropriated as the unmarked, 
natural condition of white and heteronormative masculinity and vice-versa. From 
this metaphorical field supported often by real institutional exclusion, Parker and 
Pollock then identified the specific conditions of women’s strategic artistic 
interventions, which were consistently present in all eras and places of art, but 
which were both negatively impacted by restrictions and positively enabled by the 
differential negotiation of those conditions. Each intervention then would have to be 
read work by work, formal solution by formal solution, case by case, just as we 
would do to study ‘the artist’s’ encounter with history of which Clark wrote.  As 
much as I might demand a certain equality of being part of the ‘distribution of the 
sensible’ before the court of the history of art, I cannot and should not eradicate the 
real and painful conflict that we cannot wish a way by mere intellectual tolerance.  
Just as the postcolonial critics do not wish to let well-meaning ex-colonizers off the 
hook quite yet, so the challenge posed by feminism to the world can be 
uncomfortable and pretty personal. 
 
 What are the new new art histories, then? 
 
In recent years such interlinking has been undermined in a number of ways. 
Embryonic discourses such as neuro-art history, environmental approaches to art 
and neo-Darwinian accounts have sought to create alternative ‘objective,’ ‘scientific’ 
and depoliticised paradigms of inquiry.  
 
While immanently critiquing depoliticization, this statement maintains the notion, 
none the less, that what came before was politicized. This sets up a binary 
opposition—new and newer— that is, in effect, also politicized and depoliticized.  
From the critical perspective of the 1970s, there is no politics-free zone.  
Furthermore, the operation of our art historical research is not political in the trivial 
sense, invading the space of culture from an alien sphere. That adversarial moment 
can perhaps be read through what Jacques Rancière has recently theorized as 
mésentente. Badly translated, this means ‘disagreement’. Rancière adds the concept 
of le tort/ the wrong that makes the political become the recurrent space of 
 
39 Roszika Parker and Griselda Pollock, Old Mistresses: Women, Art and Ideology London: Routledge 
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contestation because democracy or equality never arrives. The effect of the radical 
challenges of the 1970s was to disclose the politics of representation and to identify 
the role of the imaginative, the formal, and the aesthetic, in relative autonomy, as 
specific sites of the articulation of the determining structures, which class or gender 
analysis identified as being graspable in systems of representations and practices. 
That was a moment of exposing the mésentente, the generative wrongs of class, race, 
gender and sexuality.  Once articulated in adversarial form, these wrongs do not go 
away or get sorted.  Other dimensions emerge to challenge and qualify our initial 
fumbling responses to the gross wrongs of exclusion or repression of the issues.  The 
political theory of Agonism, explained by its leading exponent, Bonnie Honig 
argues that ‘to affirm the perpetuity of the contest is not to celebrate a world 
without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of perpetual contest, even 
within an ordered setting, and to identify the affirmative dimension of 
contestation.’40  
If we quarantine certain kinds of art historical project as a priori political, 
then others can claim a different cover—science—for what is, from the former 
position, as ideologically framed as their own. Being ideologically framed, subject to 
beliefs and disciplinary protocols does not mean that genuine knowledge is not 
produced; it merely reminds us that there are always limits and pressures.  James 
Brockman, for instance, published a fascinating study of answers offered by leading 
scientists to the question of what they believed but could not prove, creating a bit of 
a media uproar when the results were published because of the radical undermining 
of the association of science with proof and truth.41  Scientific research has specific 
protocols for its activities that are based on hypothesis and experimentation, but the 
scientists who frame the research and the discursive models through which they 
organize their own fields are not outside the social or immune to the ideological 
framing of their interests. 42 The radicals identify ideologies at work but they also 
accept their inevitability even in their own apparently radical projects. Marxism is a 
technology of class just as feminism is a technology of gender, participating in the 
very discourses and practices by which these social processes are represented, 
apprehended and contested.43 But those who define others as political, do not 
acknowledge the operation of ideology and hence, as positivists, can disown their 
own framings, and appeal to an imaginary form of knowledge free from politics, 
that is, from contestation and interests, and authorized by that apparently ideology-
free zone, science. This is a frank denial of the dynamics and hence politics of 
history. What could be a better refuge for those resisting the demands for self-
 
40 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993, 
15.   
41 James Brockman, What we Believe but Cannot Prove; Science in the Age of Uncertainty, London: The Free 
Press, 2005.  
42 For classic philosophy of science see Mary Hesse, Science and the Human Imagination: Aspects of the 
History and Logic of Physical Science; London, England: SCM Press, 1954; Models and Analogies in Science; 
London: Sheed and Ward, 1963; Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse, The Construction of Reality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Sandra Harding. (ed.), The Postcolonial Science and 
Technology Studies Reader, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 2011. 
43 Any discourse about gender, including feminist critique, participates in its formulation and theory 
itself functions just as much as art or cinema as a representation of gender. Teresa de Lauretis, 
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recognition as gendered, classed, sexed and raced subjectivities than to fall back on 
biology, the hugely ideologically-inflected refuge, to talk about the brain rather than 
the embodied mind, the differentiated psyche, the socially responsive subject.  
Subjectivity, corporality, sexuality, visuality: all our –ities are precisely terms 
generated to challenge the desire to invent through discourse a notion of a refuge 
from the real of sociality and socialized humanity.  
This does not mean that I would discount the explorations of neurological 
formations that use the study of the history of visualization and its current radical 
transformations through the intensification of image culture to ask new questions 
about the relays between modes of human seeing and the formulations that might, 
in a feedback loop, reshape its own material substrate. Neurological and 
psychological explorations of the conditions under which humans turn perceptual 
capacities into imaginative and inscriptive acts must be one dimension of any 
research into the history of the image and visualization.44 Such investigations are not 
new; they have a long and complex history in which their sociology does not 
disqualify the knowledge they produce.  But like all human practices, especially that 
which seeks to know how we work, such research is not immune from being a 
politics of knowledge. 
 The we come to Visual Culture, the institutionalized contestant or hybrid 
off-spring that disowns Art History on account of the latter’s privileging of the 
‘series’ of objects and their artists in favour of a concept-led field premised on 
potential cultural histories of seeing, imaging, and regimes of visual representation. 
 
On the other hand, it [visual studies] has been seen as insufficiently self-critical; for 
many proponents of visual studies its institutional success has led to a blunted 
vision, in which the value of basic categories, such as ‘art’ allegedly remain 
uninterrogated. 
 
Now we come to the fissure to the left of the field that some try to deal with 
by adding the word and between two internally contesting projects: Art History and 
Visual Culture or Visual Culture Studies, the domains and the procedures for their 
study.  Clearly visual culture studies operate with different matrices for the analysis 
of the regimes of representation and the core operation the image from what I have 
been naming the art history of the series. One might say that Visual Culture Studies 
descends from Berger and hence from Benjamin because it disowns completely the 
series of objects and the values that sustain their separate historicization. Visual 
culture takes a determinedly anti-aesthetic stance, bracketing some of the key 
questions in Art History but with specific sets of conceptual framings: - isms give 
way to ities: the visual becomes visualities, the sexual becomes sexualities, bodies 
become corporalities and the functions of the image are tracked without reference to 
the core instrument and ideological figure for aestheticizing art history: the artist, 
the artistic subject who is the effect of specific operations by art historical practice: 
 
44 In my introductory lectures to art history I set as readings for the study of the phenomenon of cave 
paintings both Whitney Davis, Replications: Archaeology, Art History and Psychoanalysis, Penn State 
University Press, 1996 and David Lewis-Williams, The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of 
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monographs, one-person shows, catalogues raisonné , authorship.  
I am tempted to agree that there might be blunting of vision or intellectual 
edge that has come about through the rather slipshod and mechanical deployment 
of certain complex elements of the expanded theoretical vocabularies necessitated 
by the profound nature of the intellectual challenge that feminist, post-colonial, 
queer and other critiques pose to the order of art historical business.  I have shivered 
at many an art history conference at the banalized versions of immensely critical 
theoretical formulations derived from deconstruction or psychoanalysis. But these 
problematic instances are typically examples of conventional Art History partially 
reclothed as Visual Culture, thus pepped up with a few concepts. This feint is 
radically different from the systematic reformulation of its foundational concepts in 
conversation with major thinking systems.  
Take the ubiquitous concept of the gaze. It is too often a blunt instrument 
with which to beat up any visual representation. When termed the male gaze, this 
instrument simply knows in advance what will be seen, reducing all works to a 
predetermined formula that is, of course, external to the actual and often complex 
operations of the visual field or scene. Firstly, I wish to insist that there is no such 
thing as ‘the male gaze’; the immense significance of the new modes of analyzing 
sexuality and spectatorship is radically short-changed by a tagline that links 
pleasure in looking at women to predatory masculine heterosexual eroticism. The 
entire point of Mulvey’s originating formulation is not that art or cinema merely 
reflect or rehearse an obvious fact that straight men like looking at women 
erotically. It is to point out counter-intuitively the opposite, and for all men 
irrespective of sexuality.  To look upon the image of woman is to risk encountering 
the threat of death. Under phallocentrism, the image of woman is the image of death 
and hence phobic defences characterize the formation of the visual economy under 
phallocentrism visually: fetishism and voyeurism. 45  Incomplete reading of theory 
can read to complete misrepresentation. 
Visual culture exercises a certain democracy of analysis, but at a price that its 
practitioners are willing to pay because of what is added to our field of 
understanding by bypassing the aesthetic and even the pathetic in the name of the 
adversarial.  But their emergence into distinctive institutional and publishing 
operations leaves the radicals in Art History who shared some of the new turns 
worrying at some losses on either side, and like me, struggling to inhabit two, 
sometimes incompatible, spheres. If Visual Culture moves out of the series and 
focuses on regimes of representation and visibility, in the Rancièreian sense, what 
forms remain for what we might now call, pace Derrida, Art History under erasure.  
How do we accommodate the aesthetic without falling back into the aestheticizing 
art history disowned by Warburg? 
Hence the introduction of the term the aesthetical in my title. Of course, 
there is a tradition of Marxist aesthetics, and indeed of feminist aesthetics, 
psychoanalytical aesthetics, migratory aesthetics, aesthetics after Auschwitz, 
 
45 For all its ubiquitous citation, the theoretical architecture of this very complex argument has been 
reduced to recycling two or three sentences, thus losing the movement of the argument. Laura 
Mulvey,’Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, Screen, 16:3 (1975), 6-18; See also Griselda Pollock 
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comparative aesthetics—led, for instance, by Parul Dave Mukherji, who works 
between Sanskrit and Western philosophical aesthetics. What are the legacies for 
thinking through the aesthetic now that do not reassert the series and its structures 
of value? 
Within the radical intellectual trends of the class of 1968 there are several 
options for thinking with the aesthetic upon which I draw.  Julia Kristeva, who 
forged a relay between the semiotic and psychic placing artistic practices at their 
hinge, represents the first.46 The aesthetic, aligned with transgressive dimensions of 
music, dance, poetry and visual art operates as the site of constant renovation and 
potential transformation of the organizing symbolic.47  These practices, forged as the 
avant-garde in conflict with the nineteenth century bourgeois state have, however, 
acquired new historical significance in the context of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century information society.48 The aesthetic acquires a newly defensive 
obligation. Kristeva argues that the administration and massification of 
subjectivities in information society and its techno-cultural forms endow aesthetic 
practices with a renewed potentiality or we might say destiny, namely, an ethical 
one, in relation to the concept of singularity that can transcend the anthropomorphic 
forms of difference in the symbolic contract that give us the delusional pairing 
man/woman.  Hence the figure of the artist might be reclaimed from the canon as a 
site not of ahistorical individuality but historically situated singularity whose value 
becomes a radical position of resistance to formulaic consumerist subjection. 49 This 
clearly chimes with feminist enquiry that does not seek to create a new collectivity 
of women artists, but to find means to specify each differentiated singularity 
without disowning the psychic as well a social conditions of differentiated existence 
and self-representation.  Equally artists who are men cease to be presented 
normatively or as universal, unmarked subjects: the artist. Their differentiated 
singularities equally require close reading and subtle specification. A pluralistic 
understanding of human conditions is then created. 
A second arena is psychoanalytical aesthetics that identifies the aesthetic 
with processes of transformation of the inner world of the subject by gestures of the 
other and by vicarious forms of gestures both materialized and symbolically 
operative in music, art, dance, etc. The aesthetic stands for the non-cognitive 
dimension of affects that arise in primordial contact with otherness of persons and 
the world. This leads into notions of art as an encounter-event whose subjectivizing 
and affective aspects can bring about affective shifts within the participating 
subjectivities mediated by aesthetically produced forms. Because of the specific 
focus on affect, this might be understood as the alliance with the pathetic, with the 
 
46 See Julia Kristeva, Revolution of Poetic Language, trans Leon Roudiez, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984. 
47 Julia Kristeva, ‘The System and the Speaking Subject’ [1973], in Toril Moi, (ed.), The Kristeva Reader, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986,  24-33. 
48 Kristeva, ‘Women’s Time’, 210. 
49 Kristeva draws on the medieval Christian philosopher Duns Scotus for this concept of singularity, 
which she then richly applied in her study of Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein and Colette as instances 
of a feminine genius.  The point is to shift from identifying someone for what they are to tracing the 
work by which the writer inscribes who s/he is.: ‘thisness’ versus a thing or person’s ‘common nature’. Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
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Warburgian realm of pathos.50 
Finally there is the Rancièrian notion of the aesthetic. Rancière formulated 
his own often-baffling vocabulary to articulate his conception of both aesthetics and 
politics.   Aesthetics is neither art theory nor the philosophical discipline that studies 
art and judgement. It refers to the ‘distribution of the sensible’: ‘le partage du 
sensible’ which clearly works better in French where the word sens oscillates 
between terms that are opposed in English: understanding or meaning and 
sensation.  Aesthetics becomes a necessary term because it too is neither cognition 
nor sense perception but a mode of apprehending while also being affected by the 
world. For Ranci￨re the distribution of the sensible is ‘the mode of articulation 
between forms of action, production, perception and thought’.51  This gives rise to 
historically differentiated regimes of this distribution or articulation. Rancière 
identifies the ethical regime of images (associated with Greek classical thought), the 
representative regime of art (associated with the French classical tradition) and the 
aesthetic regime of art (associated with romanticism and modernism). Regimes of art 
are modes ‘of articulation between three things: ways of doing and making, their 
corresponding forms of visibility, and ways of conceptualizing both the former and 
the latter.’52  
If society is composed of certain distributions of what can be said, done, 
made or heard, which are articulated in certain regimes, there is of necessity a 
certain kind of policing, or formal management and control. It is against this 
function of the police that Rancière poses politics, as a disturbance of the prevailing 
distribution of the sensible, as the actions and enunciations by which different kinds 
of political subjectivities might emerge to contest the dominant forms, even while 
there will always be elements that remain unspeakable.  The tension in society is 
premised on disagreement— la mésentente—which is not misunderstanding or lack 
of understanding. Rockhill summarizes disagreement as ‘a conflict over what is 
meant by “to speak” and “to understand” as well as over the horizons of perception 
that distinguish the audible from the inaudible, the comprehensible from the 
incomprehensible, the visible from the invisible.’ 53 The conflicts are figures of a 
wrong– le tort–which refers to failures in the field of equality that cannot be resolved 
for instance through legal procedures, a court case, but require changed forms of 
political subjectivization that will reorganize the field of experience and hence the 
distribution of the sensible.  Equality is not equalization but a work in constant 
progress composed of acts undertaken by emerging political subjectivities that 
contest the naturalized order of meaning and experience. 
This formulation rather finely states what I have been arguing: I am making 
a distinction between a certain historiographical operation that has represented, that 
is spoken of, the last forty years in a manner that polices its efficacy out of existence.  
By reasserting the adversarial, or in current terms, the agonistic dynamic as essential 
 
50 This is a very abbreviated introduction of what constitutes my major area of current research 
drawing on an extended range of theses about the psychological foundations of an aesthetic sensitivity 
and its resonance in formal artistic practices and encounters. See Pollock, After-affect/After-image: 
Trauma and Aesthetic Transformation. 
51 Gabriel Rockhill, ‘Glossary’, in Jacques Ranci￨re, The Politics of Aesthetics, 85. 
52 Rockhill, 91. 
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to a long-term struggle, by refusing to allow conflict and contestation to be 
packaged up, named, personified and reified as ‘past’, I have wanted to suggest that 
far from being over, the transformation of what can be said, thought and 
represented is still urgent, vital, incomplete.  There are ways in which its deep 
radicality has been quarantined by labelling it as ‘radical’, political, feminist, and so 
forth, while not internalizing its questioning and demands for change at the level of 
our intellectual or political subjectivities and hence practices.  The radical challenges 
to the dominant distribution of the sensible were never likely to be swiftly 
embraced.  But we can examine ourselves, who are at least identified with such 
challenging, as to how we represent this project of rethinking Art History and 
rephrasing art’s histories: how we are affected by the liquid modern trends, the 
pressure for the new, the turns of fashion and the force of the contemporaneous.  
Art History’s relation to its founding concepts of history and art, of a past 
and of the aesthetic as a value (rather than a regime, an affect-formulation or a 
shifter) was traumatically challenged ca. 1970.  Trauma defines that which cannot be 
immediately assimilated.  But, as Freud taught us, the repressed returns, belatedly 
and differently, garbed in the novel shocks of its own moment.  The search for the 
new or even the discussion of coming ‘after’ that which is confided to the demoded 
past betrays the fidelity that informs long-term projects, such as the feminist project. 
Within such long-term explorations and their continuing virtuality, there is 
inevitably regular reorientation as the ground beneath our thinking feet shifts.  
Other narratives and forgotten moments of the past can become resources and 
useful companions in this situation.   
I spend a lot of time discussing the relations between generations in a post-
patriarchal time: liquid modernity does mark the suspension of the paternal 
function in critical ways. Feminism is, however, afflicted with its own linguistic 
idiocies, none more problematic than the idea of waves: first, second, third wave for 
instance.  Intellectual daughters of the scholars of second wave are also subject to a 
longing for the new that comes after the older generation.  I want to hold on to a 
longue durée to resist the timelessness of liquid time as well as the often destructive 
logical of the Oedipal model of the generations. I want to reassert the adversarial 
and agonistic to resist the muting of pluralism and its deadly embrace. I suggest we 
can reclaim the aesthetic because transformative creativity is part of the long 
struggle. I suggest that we need to consider pathos, to remember that all of what we 
are doing is founded on suffering, violence, and exploitation and it is getting worse. 
Despite what looked to my hosts at JNU, therefore, like unexpected turns, in 
which the passionate and the aesthetical as well as the psychoanalytical appear to 
have displaced what they expected as ‘feminist-social art history’ I would maintain 
there are deep fidelities in the multi-threaded fabric of my critical project that 
represents a singular, historical moment in the long history of thinking about art, 
history, images, visualities. To respect them we need to disavow the model of the 
new and the old, the displaced and the novel, and see if at last we might actually 
internalize and, in a nachträglich, afterwardly manner, make real, effective and 
urgent the radical legacies from throughout Art History’s long durée and art’s many 
histories. Instead of the Blind Leading the Blind into endless troughs and hollows 
where we all fall down, we need another image to guide us across this multi-
occupied, shared and interacting landscape.   Griselda Pollock    Unexpected Turns 
 
  32 
 
 
Griselda Pollock is Professor of Social and Critical Histories of Art and Director of 
Centre for Cultural Analysis, Theory and History at the University of Leeds 
Developing international, post-colonial, queer feminist studies in the visual arts, 
Jewish Cultural Studies, and Warburgian cultural analysis,with  current research 
interests in trauma and cultural memory, her recent books include Art as 
Compassion: Bracha L. Ettinger edited with Catherine de Zegher (ASA Publishers, 
2011) and Concentrationary Cinema:Aesthetics as Political Resistance in Alain 
Resnais's  Night and Fog edited with Max Silverman (Berghahn, 2011). Forthcoming 
publications include After-affect / After-image: Trauma and Aesthetic 
Transformation (Manchester University Press, 2013) and Visual Politics and 
Psychoanalysis: Art & the Image in Post-traumatic Cultures (I.B. Tauris, 2013) and 
Concentrationary Memories (I.B. Tauris, 2013) 
 
 
g.f.s.pollock@leeds.ac.uk 
 